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Wage differentials in domestic work: 
The impact of contractual arrangements1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The regulation of employment relationships dates back to the process of industrialization where 
workers had dangerous and injurious working conditions. However, pervasive poor conditions, 
together with a wide range of contractual arrangements, demand additional efforts from national 
and international institutions. The Employment Relationship Recommendation 
(Recommendation 198) (ILO 2006) and the Decent Work Agenda, illustrate the International 
Labor Organization’s (ILO 2002) efforts to guarantee protection of workers’ rights in labor laws 
and other regulations, including collective agreements. These initiatives also attempt to bring 
more hidden types of employment relationships under the protection of the law. However, the 
assessment of the impact of such initiatives is still missing in the literature. Our article attempts 
to fill this gap and to offer empirical evidence on the role of regulations in the labor market of 
domestic workers. 
In recent years, great attention has been paid to millions of domestic workers 
worldwide, mainly women and girls who perform tasks such as cooking, cleaning and caring in 
private households. Such workers are often poor and/or migrants that make them particularly 
vulnerable to abuse and exploitation (Anderson 1997; Duffy 2005; Nakano Glenn 2010). Most 
domestic work takes place on an informal basis, with low wages and poor working conditions. 
By performing their jobs within private houses, domestic workers become invisible to the rest of 
society and, until very recently, to researchers and policy makers. Statistics are scarce, but 
indicate that wages are the lowest among paid occupations in any labor market (ILO 2011; 
Shierholz 2013). However, the way in which the wages are set is still an important subject to be 
explored in the literature. 
                                                          
1 Acknowledgments: 
This research was possible thanks to data collected within Domestic Work and Domestic Workers: 
Interdisciplinary and Comparative Perspectives project granted by FCT – Foundation of Science and 
Technology, of Ministry of Education and Science PTDC/JUR/65622/2006.  We have benefited from helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this study by ESPE Conference participants at the University of Minho, 
Braga, Portugal, June, 18-21, 2014 and ILP Conference at King’s College, London, UK, 7-9 April, 2014. Luís 
Martins and Sérgio Lagoa are thankfully acknowledged for their invaluable comments and suggestions. 
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Using original data from a sample of domestic workers in Portugal (N = 684), we explore the 
determinants of wages and engage in the test of two apparently contrasting theoretical models, 
namely, the compensating wage differentials and the labor market segmentation in this 
particular sector. Our study focuses specifically on the impact of contractual arrangements on 
wages. We have learned from previous research that domestic workers may be engaged in 
multiple types of contractual arrangements, such as: work for a single or multiple employers, 
part time or full time employment, living-in or out or working in formal or informal jobs (Chen 
2011; ILO 2010).  
For a proper examination of the theoretical models, we estimate the impact of 
contractual arrangements that combine two relevant features of this specific labor market, 
namely, declaration (no declaration) and stability (flexibility) in domestic work. In our study, 
declaration is associated with the registration of the employment relationship to social security 
authorities, while stability is connected to the type of payment system. In Portugal, hourly and 
daily payments make flexibility a regular feature of contractual arrangements, while the 
monthly payment system may be used to develop stable relationships. For that reason, we focus 
on four types of arrangements in our study: declared and stable, undeclared and stable, declared 
and flexible and undeclared and flexible. 
By doing so, we will be able to verify if good (bad) working conditions, proxied by the 
characteristics of contracts, correlate with higher (lower) wages. Additionally, we control for 
some socioeconomic characteristics that impact wages. However, domestic workers can select 
themselves into a contractual arrangement. Empirical analysis adopts the treatment effect model 
(Wooldrigde 2002) to deal with imprecise and inconsistent estimates arising from the OLS 
(Ordinary Least Squares) earnings model. To examine the impact of the four types of 
contractual arrangements on wages, we follow Deb and Trivedi (2006a and 2006b) and use a 
treatment-outcome model for multinomial choice of contractual arrangements. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Job characteristics and wage differentials 
Two theoretical models draw attention to the non-pecuniary aspects of jobs in the labor market. 
The compensating wage differentials (CWD hereafter) theory explores the attempts to 
compensate workers for elements of unpleasantness or risk in  jobs (Rosen 1986), while the 
labor market segmentation model supplies a picture of a dual labor market, where desirable job 
characteristics cluster with high wages, and undesirable characteristics are associated with low 
wages (Doeringer and Piore 1971). The predictions are therefore contradictory.  
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The theory of CWD predicts higher wages to compensate workers for undesirable working 
conditions and, at same time, to attract them to those jobs. It thus serves as an incentive to 
workers to voluntarily perform dirty, dangerous, or unpleasant work. Likewise, for employers, 
CWD represents a financial penalty because of unfavorable working conditions offered to 
workers. 
Despite the relevance of such an approach, empirical evidence is limited especially 
because the measures of working conditions that should imply compensation remain undefined 
(Duncan and Holmund 1983). While jobs with risks of death or injury give clear support to 
CDW arguments, other jobs are far less supportive (Brown 1980). Recent literature, tests the 
CWD hypothesis for flexible work arrangements: De la Rica and Felgueroso (1999) compare 
wage differentials between permanent and temporary workers, while Graaf-Zijl (2012) compare 
the differentials between on-call and fixed term jobs; Weeden (2005) explores the impact of 
flexible schedules and flexible work locations; Hamersma, Heinrich, and Mueser (2014) explore 
the wages and earnings of temporary help services, as well as estimate the pay gap between 
multiple job holders and temporary/non-temporary help service workers. The findings suggest 
that there is a compensation for flexible arrangements, namely, on-call workers have higher 
wages to compensate quantity flexibility (Graaf-Zijl 2012); flexible work entails higher wages 
than fixed-schedule and fixed-location counterparts (Weeden 2005); and temporary help service 
workers earn higher wages in comparison  to other workers (Hamersma, Heinrich, and Mueser 
2014). Fernandez and Nordman (2009) also confirm the presence of compensation for 
unfavorable working conditions but indicate that the amplitude and significance of the 
compensating differential is expected to differ along earnings distribution.  
However, studies inspired in the CWD model tend to overlook informal jobs, which are 
a persistent characteristic of developing as well as developed countries.  The definition of 
informal jobs has been the focus of international statistics (Hussmanns 2004) and it varies 
among studies (Bohn and Owens 2012). However, it is principally related to jobs that are 
partially or fully outside government regulation, taxation and observation (ILO 2002). Research 
adopts different proxies for informal jobs discriminating between job-category and benefit-
based definitions (Pagés and Madrigal 2008). The former criterion includes, for example, self-
employment (Pradhan and Soest 1995; Marcoulier, Ruiz de Castilla, and Woodruff 1997; 
Maloney 1999); informal salaried workers in informal firms and contract workers (Maloney 
1999). Benefit-based definition of informal employment includes, lack of pension coverage 
(Arias, 2007), jobs lacking social security coverage (Marcoulier, Ruiz de Castilla, and Woodruff 
1997; Baskaya and Hulagu 2011) and jobs outside the benefits defined by country labor laws 
(Pratap and Quintin 2006). 
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Pradhan and Soest (1995) suggest that male workers have higher wages in formal sectors, while 
women benefit from being employed in informal sectors. Marcoullier, Ruiz de Castilla, and 
Woodruff (1997) support substantial earnings differentials across countries: some countries 
show wage premium associated with informal jobs, while others have higher wages in formal 
jobs. Arias’ (2007) estimates indicate that although there are significant differences among and 
within countries, on average, informal salaried workers are penalized in all countries. 
Furthermore, these differentials are not attributable to productive characteristics and are larger 
in low-pay jobs. The results are similar to ones achieved by Baskaya and Hulagu (2011) in their 
comparison between covered and uncovered workers. 
This brief review summarizes major contrasting predictions in the literature of 
informality, namely, compensating wage differentials and labor market segmentation. 
Furthermore, literature on informality discusses the exclusion and voluntary perspectives, 
particularly in developing countries (Maloney and Arias 2007). The rationale underlying 
segmentation arguments is that workers actively seek to join high-level formal jobs but due to 
rationing in the formal labor market, they have to accept jobs in the informal markets. Against 
this involuntary view, some literature insists on workers’ preference for informal jobs. Maloney 
(1999 and 2004) argues that much of the informal sector in developing countries is voluntary, 
i.e. workers have a preference for informal rather than formal jobs. Maloney insists that the 
premium for risk, independent lifestyle and social protections costs are some of the key 
explanations for that preference.  
The reported literature reflects priorities in research agenda that tries to explore the 
specificities of informal work and deal with its social and economic implications. However, it 
lacks the particularities of wage differentials in a sector mostly characterized by informality and 
multiple contractual arrangements, such as domestic work (Chen 2011). 
 
Regulation and contractual arrangements in the labor market of domestic workers 
Domestic work is associated with reproductive work that enables productive workers to carry 
out their own jobs. Tasks include cleaning, cooking and caring tasks in private households. 
Furthermore, it is generally assumed that domestic work operates with rules different from other 
jobs in the economy (Chen 2011; Meagher 1997). First and foremost, the workplace is a private 
house. Domestic workers are therefore invisible to researchers and regulatory control; usually 
vulnerable to a various types of abuse; and engaged in unequal power relationships. 
Nevertheless, they tend to develop personal relationships with their employers, especially in the 
case of caring services (Chen 2011). This particularity makes them difficult to replace 
(Anderson 2007).  
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In addition, there are trust issues (Ruijter, van der Lippe, and Raub 2003). These are related to 
the absence of employers when workers perform their domestic tasks, to uncertainty about the 
quality of the workers and the performed tasks, as well as the risk of opportunistic behavior. 
Employers entrust their home, family members and often the keys of the house to unknown 
people. In this regard Moras (2008) underlines that households almost always rely on references 
and recommendations from their network of friends, family and neighbors when making the 
decision to hire domestic workers from the informal labor market. 
Secondly, it is well documented in the literature that domestic workers have lower 
wages, fewer benefits, and less legal or social protection compared to other workers (Shierholz 
2013; Chen 2011; Tijdens and van Klaveren 2011). However, studies on how wages are set are 
still missing in the literature. To the authors’ knowledge, one single study has been conducted 
by Shierholz (2013)
2
 and compares the wages of different categories of domestic workers with 
similar workers in other occupations in the US
3
. Firstly, domestic workers are much more likely 
to be poor than other workers in other occupations. The estimates from OLS regression indicate: 
i) penalties for all segments of domestic work with direct-care
4
 workers having the most severe 
wage penalty; ii) differentials among demographic groups; iii) differences related to working 
time, with full time workers being the most penalized. Additionally, Shierholz reports scarce 
fringe benefits, especially employer-provided health insurance plans and pension plans. On the 
other hand, ILO’s (2011) brief report proposes some hypotheses to explain wage differentials, 
namely undervaluation, pay discrimination, bargaining power, or minimum wage legislation and 
coverage. 
Thirdly, particularity of domestic work is associated with workers’ characteristics, 
which is explored through the intersection approach (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2007). Domestic work 
is intrinsically linked to gender, migration and ethnicity issues that increase the vulnerability of 
domestic workers (Nakano Glenn 2010; Moya 2007; Duffy 2005; Anderson 1997; Roberts 
1997). It is largely fulfilled by immigrants, especially undocumented, ready to enter unqualified, 
dirty and dangerous jobs (Reyneri 2003). Therefore, the degree of persistence of informality in 
domestic work might also be due to the workers’ decision, especially migrants, to remain 
                                                          
2 Marcoulier, Ruiz de Castilla, and Woodruff (1997) excluded domestic work from their analysis because 
workers usually receive payment in kind and this information is unavailable in the dataset. 
3 Machin and Manning (2004) examine the structure of wages in a similar labor market, the one of care 
assistants. Their evidence rejected competitive labor market predictions, especially because of little wage 
dispersion within firms, and high dispersion between firms. However, the study focuses on firms rather 
than households that hire domestic workers to work at their houses. 
4 Shierholz (2013) discriminates three broad segments in what she calls “in home workers”: maids and 
housekeeping cleaners, childcare workers that provide care in employers’ homes – the nannies, and those 
who provide care in their own homes. There are also direct care aides, which include two subgroups – 
those who are not agency-based and those who are agency-based. 
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invisible if they are undocumented (Chen 2011). Furthermore, domestic workers are uncertain 
about the benefits or protections of formality within an activity performed in private households 
without monitoring for compliance with labor laws, Chen adds.  
Non-negligible efforts have however been made by international and national bodies to 
promote decent work for domestic workers (see Blackett 2011 for a brief history). Blackett 
highlights that at the core of the law and practice, promoted by ILO initiatives, is to transform a 
status relationship, notably associated with domestic slavery and forced work, to a work 
relationship with labor rights and dignity. Several steps have been taken by international and 
national bodies to ensure that the transition from status relationships to work relationships has 
been effectively implemented. The major challenge in this regard is the adoption of the  ILO 
Convention 189
5
, especially to include  domestic work in the scope of labor legislation; to 
provide social protection and equitable pay, including minimum wage; and to ensure the right to 
create or join trade unions and bargain at collective levels (Blackett 2011; Caracciolo, Henry, 
and Rosenbusch 2011). 
Particular efforts have been concentrated on expanding the social security coverage to 
domestic workers and social protection (Gomes and Puig 2013; Tokman 2010), simplifying the 
calculation and deduction schemes (Tomei, 2011), regulating overtime compensation (Mundlak 
and Shamir 2011) and regulating private employment agencies (Tsikata 2011). Despite relevant 
progress and examples of implementation of recommendations and national initiatives, the 
inequities between domestic workers and other workers still persist (Erdoğdu and Toksöz 2013; 
Grilo-Chope and Ramos 2006). The exclusion of domestic workers as workers is, in fact, 
originated from the law (Blackett 2011).  
Therefore, the decision to engage domestic workers in an employment relationship is 
not independent from the acknowledgement of the economic and social relevance of domestic 
work, and more importantly the particularities of care work. While the topic is in itself a major 
social and economic issue, it deserves further attention at a time when countries worldwide are 
trying to promote decent work and dignity for domestic workers. Thus, the open questions are:  
How labor market and employer-based regulations impact the working conditions, especially 
the wages of domestic workers? Is there a wage gap between stable/flexible or formal/informal 
jobs?   
                                                          
5 ILO 189 Convention, ratified in 2011, concerns decent work for domestic workers and entered into force 
in 2013:  
http://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/100thSession/media-centre/press-releases/WCMS_157891/lang--
en/index.htm. 
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Much of the research on domestic work has progressed towards socioeconomic characteristics, 
working conditions and regulations, but the impact of institutional initiatives is still unexplored 
in the literature. 
 
The regulation on domestic work in Portugal 
The Portuguese labor market provides an interesting case study due to the tradition of hiring 
live-in domestic workers, “criadas” (Brasão 2012), to it being a host country for female migrant 
domestic workers (Baptista 2011) and to extending much of the legal protection, which covers 
the general workforce, to domestic workers (GAMI 2012).  
The legislation on domestic work in Portugal dates back to 1980 but much progress was 
made in the early 1990s. The Decree-law 235/92 stipulates the working conditions that 
employers must give workers, namely, the tasks to be performed, the pay and pay components 
including paid holidays and Christmas bonus, and other working conditions. According to this 
decree-law, employment contracts do not need to be in writing to be legally valid (Martins 
2009). Formal contracts are obligatory only in the case of fixed term contracts and to obtain or 
renew visas for foreign workers. In all other relationships, domestic workers are recommended 
to formalize their contracts in order to enjoy more favorable social protection (GAMI 2012). 
Like other paid workers in Portugal, domestic workers are entitled to the national 
minimum wage, which is set as a monthly-based pay at 485 Euros (in 2012) for live-in or full-
time workers. As regards the rates for social security contributions, domestic workers can 
choose between two plans, namely paying the rates on the basis of a pre-set wage or on the basis 
of the total earned wage (GAMI 2012). However, the social security rates levied on a pre-set 
wage are lower than those based on total earnings. In the first case the rates are 18.9% for 
employers and 9.40% for workers compared with 22.3% and 11% respectively when based on 
total earned wages; however, domestic workers are eligible for unemployment insurance 
schemes under the latter system. An additional requirement to be eligible for unemployment 
benefit is that domestic workers must have been in a full-time job with a monthly-based wage. 
Furthermore, social security authorities impose a minimum of 30 hours of work per month for 
the pre-set wage system. 
The Portuguese government has ratified the ILO Convention 189 recently (Parliament 
Resolution 42/2015) and will expectedly implement those recommendations, while national 
bodies have taken active steps in developing materials and disseminating information on legal 
rights and legislations in domestic work (e.g. GAMI 2012). Nevertheless, the poor working 
conditions in domestic work in Portugal still persist. Illegal migration and undeclared work have 
largely contributed to the perpetuation of unfavorable conditions (Reyneri 2003; Pereira 2013). 
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METHODS 
The dataset 
Our empirical analysis draws on an original cross-sectional dataset of domestic workers in 
Portugal collected in 2010 from an international project (see Guibentif 2011 for details). Given 
the characteristics of domestic workers and their workplace, snowball sampling was used to 
gain access to participants. The contact details of domestic workers were obtained from 
domestic work unions, immigration-related institutions, and personal acquaintances. 
The data were gathered in face to face interviews and cover geographically dispersed 
domestic workers (N = 684). The dataset includes detailed information on the following socio-
demographic characteristics:  gender, particular skills required in the hiring process, the relevant 
skills from the domestic worker’s perspective, the demand for additional skills, assigned tasks, 
pay system, earnings, working time, working conditions, employment contracts, fiscal and 
social security contributions, employers’ characteristics, and the domestic worker’s family 
background. 
Though some variables are self-descriptive, others deserve further explanation. For 
instance, information about contractual arrangements was collected by asking domestic workers, 
through yes/no questions, about the existence of a written employment contract, the payment of 
social security and income tax and the payment system including hourly, daily or monthly 
contracts. In addition, respondents reported if they worked for a single or several employers and 
if they were live-in or live-out workers.  
The tasks performed were collected from a list of 19 items detailing the specific 
cleaning, cooking, child and elderly care tasks. We recoded domestic workers into three types of 
job: cleaners, children caregivers, and elderly care workers. It should be highlighted that the 
tasks of carers overlap with those of cleaners, but children care workers never take up elderly 
care tasks and vice-versa (Suleman and Suleman 2011). 
The skills were assessed through self-perception of relevant skills. The questionnaire 
includes the following question: “If you were an employer, which skills would you look for in a 
domestic worker?” We assume that the workers would mention the skills they consider suitable 
to perform household tasks. This might proxy the skills required in the domestic work. The 
survey included further questions regarding the skills and abilities of domestic workers. 
Domestic workers were also asked whether their employers demanded specific requirements.  
Trust issues including whether employers ask for references and how the domestic 
worker got the job were also addressed in the survey. Moreover, the sampled domestic workers 
stated whether they were entrusted with the key of the house and how work was monitored. 
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Monitoring activities were assessed through the presence (absence) of employer in the 
workplace during working hours. 
Due to disparate records of earnings, we experienced difficulties in establishing data for 
hourly wages. Domestic workers reported their wages on an hourly, daily, weekly or monthly 
base. In order to achieve a standard that facilitates further analysis, we computed hourly wage 
using data on total working days per month and week, and the total working hours per day, 
reported by the domestic workers themselves. Of course, this was not necessary for readily 
available data on hourly wages.  
The most difficult cases are those associated with live-in workers on call 24 hours a day. 
For these, we decided to consider at least 7 hours of rest per day and allocated 17 hours of work. 
On the other hand, as some live-in workers reported one day off per week, we excluded one day 
from the total days per week. However, the dataset does not include information on public 
holidays. 
Where applicable, hourly wage accommodates the value related to Christmas and 
holiday bonuses. We weighted the hourly wage by 1.083 if the worker receives one bonus and 
1.166 if there are two bonuses. In other words, the worker is paid 13 or 14 monthly wages a 
year. It should be stressed that some hourly-wage based domestic workers are entitled to 
bonuses and the weighting was applied in the same way in these cases. However, the dataset 
does not enable us to confirm whether the workers who reported receiving holiday allowances 
actually get paid holiday. 
Finally, we use the net hourly wage. Our dataset includes declared or formal and 
undeclared or informal workers. The former bears the costs of social contributions
6
, while the 
informal workers earn the reported wages. For the sake of comparison, we deducted the social 
contributions costs from the wages of declared domestic workers, which vary among two plans 
(paying rates on the pre-set or total earned wage) and reduced their wages by 10%
7
. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 The information on the contribution plan selected by the domestic workers is not available in the dataset. 
As the contributions vary between 9.40% and 11%, we used an average of 10%. However, the 
information on income taxes is unavailable in the dataset. 
7  Although the costs, the social security protection has short and long term benefits that cannot be 
captured by our model. For example, declaration allows accessing to unemployment insurance as well as 
to retirement benefits. 
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EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The variables 
To test the impact of the proposed measures of contractual arrangements, this section describes 
the econometric model to estimate the wage differentials among four types of contractual 
arrangements that combine coverage by social security and stability: declared and stable; 
undeclared and stable; declared and flexible; and undeclared and flexible domestic workers. 
While the declared contract presupposes the declaration to social security authorities and the 
payment of respective contributions, the stability (flexibility) of the relationship is measured 
through the payment system, i.e. by monthly (hourly or daily) based system. From our day-to-
day experience, households try to develop indefinite or continuing relationships by paying 
monthly-based wages instead of hourly or daily. This generally makes the relationship between 
households and domestic workers long term. Benefits associated with declaration reinforce the 
impact of labor market regulations in reducing inequalities, be it stable or flexible, and points to 
segmentation hypothesis, in that informal workers represent a disadvantaged group in the labor 
market. On the contrary, if the labor market enables undeclared workers to have positive wage 
differentials it suggests that informality is compensated by higher wages. The compensating 
wage differentials predictions are fully met by higher wages of undeclared and flexible 
arrangements. 
In addition, our model includes a set of control variables for socioeconomic 
characteristics like age, origin which is mostly relevant in a market filled by migrants, marital 
status, job status to control for single or multiple employers, trust-related issues associated with 
the network to obtain a job and recommendation of the candidate, job requirements, namely the 
skills required to perform household tasks, occupational structure to explore the role of caring 
tasks and household characteristics related to the type of workplace (see Table A1 in Appendix 
for the description of variables). 
 
Hypotheses 
We propose to empirically test two contrasting theoretical hypotheses to explore the drivers of 
wages in the labor market of domestic workers: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The compensating wage differentials assuming that domestic workers 
are compensated with higher wages for undeclared and flexible arrangements. 
Hypothesis 2: Labor market segmentation arguing that undeclared and flexible 
workers suffer a wage penalization in the labor market.  
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Additionally, we test the predictions of human capital and impact of innate 
characteristics. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Domestic workers are rewarded for their skills. 
Hypothesis 4: The social origin of workers influences the wages of domestic workers. 
 
The econometric model 
Our first approach to explore the drivers of wages in domestic work is an OLS regression 
model, where the dependent variable is the hourly wage in logarithm form. However, the major 
problem in our estimation is the possibility of inconsistent estimators due to endogenous 
selection bias associated with the choice of contractual arrangement. Any worker in the 
economy can voluntarily choose informal jobs when entering the labor market simply because 
of his/her personal preference for or because he/she has to accept informal jobs due to the 
scarcity of formal ones (Maloney and Arias 2007). We assume that endogenous selection in 
domestic work arises because the knowledge of legal rights and benefits from regulations varies 
among domestic workers. As reported, domestic workers are doubtful about the benefits or 
protections of formality within an invisible activity performed in private households without 
monitoring for compliance with labor laws (Chen 2011). Therefore, those being aware of rights 
and benefits may have preference for formal arrangements, while others may choose 
informality. These traits have an impact on the choice and lead domestic workers to select 
contractual arrangements accordingly. Furthermore, national bodies seek to increase and 
broaden the access of domestic workers, and especially migrants, to their legal rights by 
increasing the knowledge of laws and labor rights in domestic work in Portugal (GAMI 2012). 
To examine the impact of the four types of contractual arrangements on wages, we 
follow Deb and Trivedi (2006a and 2006b) and use a treatment-outcome model for multinomial 
choice of contractual arrangements. The treatment effects approach is suitable for dealing with 
endogenous selection as is the case of contractual arrangements in our wage determinants model 
(Maddala 1983; Imbens and Angrist 1994). The concept of treatment effects is inspired by the 
literature on the effects of medical treatment related to medicine tests before its introduction in 
the market. Binary variable represents the medical treatment, which takes the value 1 if the 
individual is treated with the medicine and 0 if he/she got a placebo. Therefore, literature 
suggests that treatment effects refer to an effect measured for a binary explanatory variable 
(Wooldridge 2002). Neglecting selection leads to correlation of the errors terms and 
consequently leads to an omitted variable bias. 
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However, we have multiple, instead of binary, arrangements, which call for the multinomial 
choice model (Deb and Trivedi 2006b). It is, in fact, an extension of the treatment model 
applied to multinomial choice. The model assumes joint distribution of endogenous treatment 
and wages using latent factor structure and applies maximum simulated likelihood approach for 
estimation. These econometric solutions are captured into mtreatreg Stata command and 
presuppose a model with two sets of equations: the selection and the outcome equations. 
The determinants of contractual arrangements include the above-mentioned 
socioeconomic variables that influence wages and an additional instrument to illustrate domestic 
workers’ knowledge of legal rights and benefits. The questionnaire asked domestic workers “if 
needed, would you be willing to use courts to appeal against any failures to comply with 
contractual obligations?” We assume that the affirmative answers to this question indicate the 
knowledge of rights and benefits associated with the type of contractual arrangement. As a 
consequence, informed workers will be more able to be engaged in legal and stable employment 
relationships, while ill-informed workers may select occasional and informal work. 
It should be stressed that the matrix of covariates    does not necessarily require 
additional variables relative to    to become identified. However, we have decided to include an 
exclusion restriction or instrument, the “knowledge of legal rights” in the treatment equation, as 
was suggested by Deb and Trivedi (2006a). Therefore, latent factors enter into the outcome and 
treatments equations in the same way as observed covariates and incorporate unobserved 
characteristics related to the knowledge of legal rights. On the other hand, since latent factors 
enter the likelihood function but are unknown, the maximization of the likelihood function is 
performed through simulation by drawing several random numbers from a standard normal 
distribution. 
We give a formal representation of the model for the choice of contractual arrangement, 
where each individual i chooses a type of contractual arrangement j from a set of four choices 
          ) where      is the control group (undeclared and flexible). Let     
  denote the 
utility associated with the hourly wage of individual i contractual arrangement j with and  
 
    
    
              
 
where    denotes a set of exogenous covariates with parameters   ,     are i.i.d. error terms, and 
    are latent factors which incorporate unobserved characteristics common to the individual i ’s 
status choice and outcome (logarithm of hourly wage,    ). The     are assumed to be 
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independent of     . As a normalization       
    , so the expected utility of j -th status is the 
differential utility relative to undeclared and flexible arrangement. 
Let    be binary selection variables representing the observed contractual arrangement 
choice and                ). Also let                ). Then the mixed multinomial logit 
structure for the probability of contractual arrangement choice can be represented as   
 
    |     )  
   (  
         )
  ∑    (  
         )
 
   
 
 
The expected outcome equation for individual i is formulated as 
 
    )    
   ∑      ∑     
 
   
 
   
 
 
where    is a set of exogenous variables and    denote the treatment effects relative to 
undeclared and flexible. The expected value of log hourly wage,     ), is a function of the 
latent factors     so that it is affected by unobserved characteristics which affect the selection 
into a contractual arrangement as well. The interpretation of the    factor-loading parameters is 
the following: when     is positive (negative), unobserved factors which increase the probability 
of selecting j-th contractual arrangement also increase (reduce) the hourly wage. 
In order to estimate parameters of the model, latent factors are assumed to be i.i.d. 
Draws from the standard normal distribution and simulation-based method are used to 
maximize the log likelihood. Provided the number of draws is sufficiently large (we select 350 
draws), maximization of the simulated log likelihood is equivalent to maximizing the log 
likelihood. Parameters of this model are identified when       , but Deb and Trivedi (2006b) 
recommend including some variables in    which are not included in     . 
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Descriptive statistics 
Primarily, we used a principal components analysis (PCA) to reduce the 14 skills and abilities 
variables, measured by self-perception of required skills, to a smaller, more manageable number 
of components that explain a large proportion of the variance. The categories of skills grouped 
through PCA are: personal traits, specific skills, flexibility and general skills (see Table A2 for 
details in Appendix).  
Table 1 provides summary statistics of variables, detailed in Table A1, used to estimate 
the determinants of wages in the labor market of domestic workers. It should be stressed that 
domestic work is almost exclusively a female job (99.6% of the sample) in Portugal. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics [mean, (SD)] 
 Declared 
and stable 
Undeclared 
and stable 
Declared and 
flexible 
Undeclared 
and flexible 
Hourly wage (ln, [euro]) 1.309 
[3.70] 
(0.465) 
1.301 
[3.67] 
(0.490) 
1.681 
[5.37] 
(0.344) 
1.678 
[5.35] 
(0.320) 
Multiple employer 
(Yes = 1) 
0.460 
(0.499) 
0.455 
(0.502) 
0.760 
(0.429) 
0.636 
(0.483) 
Network to obtain job: 
relatives (Yes = 1) 
0.184 
(0.388) 
0.209 
(0.410) 
0.211 
(0.409) 
0.135 
(0.343) 
Network to obtain job: 
friends (Yes = 1) 
0.561 
(0.498) 
0.455 
(0.502) 
0.618 
(0.487) 
0.685 
(0.467) 
Network to obtain job: 
others (Yes = 1) 
0.255 
(0.437) 
0.209 
(0.41) 
0.171 
(0.378) 
0.180 
(0.386) 
Employer required 
particular skills (Yes = 1) 
0.376 
(0.485) 
0.246 
(0.434) 
0.235 
(0.425) 
0.153 
(0.362) 
Personal traits 
(PCA scores) 
0.034 
(0.931) 
-0.018 
(1.030) 
-0.074 
(1.070) 
0.015 
(1.066) 
Specific skills 
(PCA scores) 
0.156 
(0.957) 
0.089 
(1.008) 
-0.175 
(0.988) 
-0.175 
(1.022) 
General skills 
(PCA scores)  
0.200 
(1.061) 
-0.340 
(0.769) 
-0.141 
(0.946) 
-0.122 
(0.934) 
Elderly caring tasks 
(Yes = 1) 
0.250 
(0.434) 
0.130 
(0.339) 
0.118 
(0.324) 
0.09 
(0.288) 
Children caring tasks 
(Yes = 1) 
0.242 
(0.429) 
0.333 
(0.475) 
0.164 
(0.372) 
0.162 
(0.370) 
Cleaning tasks 
(Yes = 1) 
0.508 
(0.501) 
0.536 
(0.502) 
0.717 
(0.452) 
0.748 
(0.436) 
Age (years) 43.518 
(10.772) 
45.309 
(14.367) 
41.47 
(11.562) 
43.036 
(12.087) 
Origin 
(Migrant = 1) 
0.357 
(0.480) 
0.275 
(0.45) 
0.329 
(0.471) 
0.315 
(0.467) 
Living in a house 
(Yes = 1) 
0.427 
(0.496) 
0.382 
(0.490) 
0.333 
(0.473) 
0.288 
(0.455) 
N 256 69 152 111 
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At the outset, descriptive statistics suggest variations of wages among workers involved in 
different contractual arrangements. The figures displayed in Table 1 indicate wage differential 
among stable and flexible workers; and declared jobs, whether they are stable or flexible, 
impose slightly higher wages than undeclared ones. Furthermore, workers involved with 
multiple employers tend to earn higher wages than single-employer contracts. 
A similar aspect of the type of contractual arrangements is evident in the access of 
additional payments. The evidence reported in Table 2 corroborates the benefits of being 
engaged in declared contracts. 
 
 
Table 2 
Pay package by contractual arrangements (%) 
 
Pay components Declared and 
Stable 
Undeclared 
and Stable 
Declared and 
Flexible 
Undeclared and 
Flexible 
Christmas bonus 80.5 53.6 51.0 28.8 
Holiday allowances 77.3 44.9 52.3 18.9 
Health insurance 30.2 7.4 13.4 3.6 
Food allowance  21.2 10.4 12.2 3.6 
 
 
As can be denoted, undeclared workers receive less favorable treatment in both situations. The 
pay package of declared and stable workers seems to be closer to the package of any other 
employees in the economy, while occasional workers draw non-negligible benefits from being 
declared. 
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The impact of contractual arrangements on wages 
The estimates from the OLS regression model displayed in Table 3
8
 indicate that stable 
contracts imply a non-negligible wage penalization to domestic workers. The difference is even 
greater for undeclared workers in stable contracts. 
Table 3 
Economic returns to contractual arrangements in domestic work: OLS estimates 
Model Estimates  
Contractual arrangements 
(a)
  
Declared and stable (Yes = 1) -0.267*** 
(0.046) 
Undeclared and stable (Yes = 1) -0.350*** 
(0.0.61) 
Declared and flexible (Yes = 1) -0.002 
(0.043) 
Multiple employer (Yes = 1) 0.135*** 
(0.036) 
Network
(b)
 
 Relatives (Yes = 1) -0.009 
(0.045) 
Other network (Yes = 1) -0.087* 
(0.046) 
Demand for particular skills (Yes = 1) -0.114*** 
(0.039) 
Self-perception of relevant skills  
Personal traits (PCA scores) -0.0003 
(0.984) 
Specific skills (PCA scores) 0.036** 
(0.018) 
General skills (PCA scores) -0.052*** 
(0.017) 
Occupational structure 
(c)
 
 Elderly caring tasks (Yes = 1) 0.021 
(0.051) 
Children caring tasks (Yes = 1) -0.011 
(0.043) 
Age (years) 0.0004 
(0.787) 
Origin (Migrant = 1) -0.050 
(0.191) 
Living in a house (Yes = 1) -0.010*** 
(0.038) 
Constant 1.638*** 
(0.082) 
N  557 
R
2
 0.253 
Reference categories: (a)Undeclared and flexible; (b)Friends; 
(c)Cleaning tasks. (*) Statistically significant at the 0.10 level; (**) 
at the 0.05 level; (***) at the 0.01 level 
                                                          
8 We checked for correlation among variables and excluded some from the model. For example, multiple 
employer condition is negatively correlated with live-in status. A live-in domestic worker is hardly able to 
work for more than one employer. In all other variables the correlations are not statistically significant or 
negligible (<|    |). 
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Table 4 displays the estimates of treatment-outcome model for multinomial choice to control for 
endogenous selection bias. The results show that the estimates from OLS and treatment model 
vary considerably.  The estimates with correction by treatment model reported in columns 5 
show some relevant differences especially those associated with the impact of contractual 
arrangements. Furthermore, the lambda (λ), which measures the impact of selection, is 
statistically significant for the three arrangements indicating that our prediction of endogenous 
selection is correct. The OLS estimates are therefore biased and we will continue our analysis 
on the basis of treatment approach estimates. Furthermore, our test of degree of substitutability 
among contractual arrangements revealed that IIA assumption has not been violated. 
 
Table 4 
Economic returns to contractual arrangements in domestic work: 
Endogenous multinomial treatment effect estimates 
 
Declared and 
stable 
Undeclared and 
stable 
Declared and 
flexible 
ln (hourly 
wage) 
Multiple employer (Yes=1) -0.617** 
(0.284) 
-0.736** 
(0.373) 
0.756** 
(0.317) 
0.183*** 
(0.009) 
Network
a
 
 
   
Relatives (Yes=1) 0.560 
(0.391) 
0.363 
(0.495) 
0.580 
(0.400) 
-0.035** 
(0.015) 
Other network (Yes=1) 0.657* 
(0.372) 
0.398 
(0.496) 
0.184 
(0.392) 
-0.095*** 
(0.014) 
Demand for particular skills (Yes = 1) 0.860** 
(0.339) 
0.501 
(0.433) 
0.496 
(0.377) 
-0.082*** 
(0.016) 
Self-perception of relevant skills     
Personal traits (PCA scores) 0.014 
(0.142) 
-0.063 
(0.188) 
-0.126 
(0.150) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Specific skills (PCA scores) 0.323** 
(0.139) 
0.135 
(0.205) 
0.021 
(0.144) 
-0.062*** 
(0.004) 
General skills (PCA scores) 0.318** 
(0.146) 
-0.382* 
(0.200) 
-0.048 
(0.317) 
-0.043*** 
(0.002) 
Occupational structure
(b)
 
 
   
Elderly caring tasks (Yes=1) 1.512*** 
(0.408) 
0.819 
(0.588) 
0.198 
(0.461) 
0.095*** 
(0.008) 
Children caring tasks (Yes=1) 0.972*** 
(0.373) 
1.133** 
(0.446) 
0.227 
(0.391) 
-0.071*** 
(0.016) 
Age (years) 0.004 
(0.766) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0003) 
Origin (Migrant =1) 0.345 
(0.303) 
-0.052 
(0.420) 
0.237 
(0.308) 
-0.090*** 
(0.010) 
Living in a house (Yes=1) 0.625** 
(0.295) 
0.589 
(0.389) 
0.191 
(0.317) 
-0.084*** 
(0.008) 
Knowledge of legal rights (Yes=1) 1.430*** 
(0.282) 
0.183 
(o.374) 
1.268*** 
(0.291) 
 
 Constant -1.183* 
(0.688) 
-1.842** 
(0.934) 
-1.250* 
(0.687) 
1.557*** 
(0.018) 
 
 
   
Wage differentials in domestic work: 
The impact of contractual arrangements 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
DINÂMIA’CET – IUL, Centro de Estudos sobre a Mudança Socioeconómica e o Território 
ISCTE-IUL – Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, PORTUGAL 
Tel. 210464031 - Extensão 293100  E-mail: dinamia@iscte.pt http://dinamiacet.iscte-iul.pt/ 
19 
 
Contractual Arrangements
(c)
  
 
   
Declared and stable (Yes=1) 
 
  -0.042*** 
(0.013) 
Undeclared and stable (Yes=1) 
 
  -0.245*** 
(0.017) 
Declared and flexible (Yes=1) 
 
  0.215*** 
(0.011) 
 
 
   
  (Declared and stable) 
 
  -0.273*** 
(0.004) 
  (Undeclared and stable) 
 
  0.071*** 
(0.004) 
  (Declared and flexible) 
 
  -0.300*** 
0.003) 
Observations 545 
Reference categories: (a)friends; (b)cleaning tasks; (c)undeclared and flexible. (*) Statistically significant at the 0.10 level; 
(**) at the 0.05 level; (***) at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
The evidence from selection equation in Table 4 presents positive and significant signs of 
unobserved workers’ characteristics proxied by the knowledge of legal rights and benefits in the 
declared arrangements. Domestic workers having that knowledge are 4.2 (      )9 times more 
likely to be selected in declared and stable contracts, while they are 3.6 (      ) times more 
probable in declared but flexible arrangements. We conclude that self-selection exists and 
domestic workers choose an efficient arrangement.  
Socioeconomic features are also relevant predictors of contractual arrangements. For 
example, the tasks to be performed and the skills required by households have a positive and 
significant impact on declared and stable contracts. The contracts involving working for 
multiple employers increase the probability of being engaged in flexible arrangements and at the 
same time decrease the likelihood of stable contracts in declared jobs. In addition, the estimates 
suggest that workplace characteristics have an impact on contractual arrangements. Employers 
living in houses are more likely to offer declared and stable jobs. 
Our findings from the equation of interest, the outcome equation, are consistent with 
wage differentials among the range of contractual arrangements that cross declaration (no 
declaration) and stability (flexibility) in the labor market of domestic workers. Declared and 
stable workers have a wage penalization of almost 4.2% compared to counterfactual group of 
undeclared and flexible domestic workers, while the penalization of stable but undeclared 
workers is about 24.5%. Furthermore, contingent workers, the ones being paid on an hourly or 
                                                          
9  Powers and Xie (2000) encourage the use of odds ratio rather than marginal effects to interpret 
nonlinear models estimates. 
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daily basis, tend to have a high hourly wage, which is higher for declared workers. This finding 
is coherent with the multiple employer workers that have higher wages (18.3%). 
An interesting finding is associated with skills required to perform household tasks. 
General and specific skills are drivers of earnings in domestic work but negative and significant 
signs of the estimates are puzzling. The same holds for the negative sign associated with the 
requirement of particular skills. The trust-related estimate suggests that employers pay higher 
wages to domestic workers recommended by friends than to those hired from agencies or 
recommended by other networks. There are also wage differential between migrants and native 
workers. Being migrant imposes a wage penalization of almost 10%. Finally, the employers 
living in houses tend to pay lower earnings than those living in apartments. They are also 
willing to pay higher wages for workers responsible for elderly care. 
 
DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The contractual arrangements in the labor market of domestic workers in Portugal are quite 
heterogeneous and parallel the typology proposed by Chen (2011). The results obtained from 
descriptive analysis indicate that domestic workers in Portugal work for one or a set of 
employers; are full-time for one employer or part-time for more than one household; are 
engaged in declared or undeclared relationships; earn on monthly basis, suggesting that they 
have, at least, a continuous relationship; or are contingent being paid on hourly or daily basis 
and live in the employer’s house or are external workers. These properties of arrangements have 
non-negligible impacts on the wages earned by domestic workers.  
The findings are consistent with wage differentials among arrangements and illustrate 
that regulations tend to reduce inequalities in the labor market. The wage penalization of stable 
workers meets the findings by Shierholz (2013) because full-time workers have lower wages in 
the labor market of domestic workers. However, it is lower for declared than for undeclared 
workers in the same condition, while the benefits of flexible contracts are higher for those that 
are declared compared to flexible and undeclared workers. As in Marcoullier, Ruiz de Castilla 
and Woodruff (1997) our findings suggest a wage premium for formal employment 
relationships, whereas workers assigned to informal jobs experience a wage penalization in the 
labor market (Arias 2007). Therefore, empirical evidence in this article adds the relevance of 
social security coverage that imposes some kind of minimum wage to hire domestic workers. In 
addition, the results corroborate the predictions of segmentation arguments because informal 
workers earn lower wages.  
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The benefits of declaration surpass wage differentials. Declared workers have additional 
monetary and non-monetary benefits. The data offered evidence on the larger proportion of 
workers earning Christmas and holiday bonuses within declared jobs than in informal 
employment relationships (Table 2). While Shierholz (2013) has highlighted the limited benefits 
for domestic workers, our study offers evidence on segmentation inside domestic work and 
illustrates that compensation packages vary among contractual arrangements. Additionally, the 
evidence reinforces the view that undeclared workers represent a secondary segment in the labor 
market and are more likely to lack benefits like health insurance or food allowances. 
Empirical evidence is partially consistent with the presence of compensating wage 
differentials in the labor market of domestic workers (De la Rica and Felgueroso 1999). On 
average, workers benefit from contingent contracts. Compared to the group of monthly-based 
workers, contingent workers earn a higher hourly wage. The results indicate that those domestic 
workers working for multiple employers are compensated for their time when moving from 
household to household. The higher hourly wage of contingent workers does compensate for 
non-productive time. 
At this stage, we can claim that no single theory predicts the determination of wages in 
the labor market of domestic workers. Furthermore, the predictions of human capital have been 
called into question. The negative signs of proxies of skills suggest that households demand for 
general and specific skills but are unwilling to reward them. The absence of monetary incentives 
associated with skills, evidences the undervaluation of domestic work (ILO 2011), which is 
usually perceived as an unskilled job. However, skills are important to access stable jobs, as can 
be drawn from selection equation. Ultimately, skills enable formality and stability in contracts; 
but are irrelevant to generating rents for domestic workers. 
There are signals that stable relationships might be relevant for employers, especially 
when dealing with particularities of caring tasks. The findings from the selection equation 
suggest that care imposes more stability than cleaning, while the earnings equation offers 
evidence on higher wages for workers dealing with older people. Probably, elderly caregivers 
are compensated for the range of services given to help people maintain their wellbeing, dignity 
and autonomy, as well as being available at any time. 
Finally, the estimates offered non-negligible wage differentials between migrant and 
native workers. In this light, we are able to corroborate claims of higher vulnerability of migrant 
domestic workers (Moya 2007; Duffy 2005) in Portugal. While the data illustrated that domestic 
work is almost exclusively a female job, the regression model offered evidence on lower wages 
of migrant women. 
Wage differentials in domestic work: 
The impact of contractual arrangements 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
DINÂMIA’CET – IUL, Centro de Estudos sobre a Mudança Socioeconómica e o Território 
ISCTE-IUL – Av. das Forças Armadas, 1649-026 Lisboa, PORTUGAL 
Tel. 210464031 - Extensão 293100  E-mail: dinamia@iscte.pt http://dinamiacet.iscte-iul.pt/ 
22 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Domestic workers are employed in private houses and their jobs are invisible, while their wages 
tend to be among the lowest in the labor market. They also have the propensity to be engaged in 
informal employment relationships constituting one of the most vulnerable categories of 
workers. However, working hand-in-hand with ILO, several countries, including Portugal, are 
reforming policies and legislation to dignify and give rights to domestic workers. Our study 
offers insights in this respect and shows evidence of the positive impact of regulations on the 
earnings of a sample of domestic workers in Portugal. 
In fact, our estimates suggest that domestic workers who are legally hired benefit from 
declaration of their employment relationship to social security authorities. As afore-mentioned, 
social security contributions are paid on a pre-defined minimum hourly, daily or monthly wage, 
which contributes to increase the hourly wage. However, Portuguese social security law admits 
differentiation inside domestic work. While two plans contribution system (contributions on 
pre-set wage or total earnings) may encourage declaration, it also raises relevant differences in 
the access to benefits for domestic workers. This is particularly the case of social protection 
during spells of unemployment. As reported, only full-time and monthly paid workers are 
eligible for insurance, while contingent work, usually based on hourly wages, does not benefit 
from such protection. It has to be stressed that social security law reinforces segmentation inside 
domestic work. 
There is a wage gap between stable/flexible and declared/undeclared workers. Domestic 
workers are compensated for their non-productive time when engaged in multiple and 
intermittent contracts. However, there is also a wage premium associated with formality. Our 
findings corroborate the hypothesis of compensating wage differential for contingent workers 
and support the hypothesis of labor market segmentation in that the informal workers represent 
a disadvantaged group. Therefore, the results boost the impact of regulations on earnings in the 
labor market of domestic workers after controlling for endogenous selection bias. Domestic 
workers in the sample select themselves into different contractual arrangements and use their 
knowledge of rights to demand for compliance with the law. 
 The study supplied a detailed analysis of the situation of the labor market of domestic 
workers in Portugal, which includes native and migrant workers. The findings will help 
encourage the dialogue between different labor market players and policy makers. Ultimately, 
the findings are particularly striking in Southern European labor markets which are mostly 
characterized by informality.  
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An important question arises however from our study. Declaration of the employment 
relationship imposes non-negligible costs for employers and workers Maloney (1999 and 2004). 
This brings us to a puzzle, which is at the core of the formalization discussion. The unanswered 
question is to what extent those costs are irrelevant in the context of wage cuts, especially for 
the middle class women who need the aid of domestic workers to participate in the labor 
market. Further research should assess households’ perception about formality and the 
associated costs, while policy makers have to consider tax incentives to encourage declaration. 
It has to be stressed that dignity in domestic work can only be achieved when both players have 
the interest of being engaged in a true employment relationship. 
Although our empirical evidence is interesting, all results must be regarded with 
caution. The sample is small, based on snowball sampling and therefore lacks randomness. 
However, it is extremely complicated to create a random and representative dataset due to the 
size and dispersed nature of the universe. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Description of the variables in the model 
Variable Definition of the variable 
Dependent variable  
Hourly wage Natural logarithm of hourly net wage:  
reported wage minus 10% for declared workers 
(Euro) 
Explanatory variables  
Contractual arrangements  
Declared and stable 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Undeclared and stable 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Declared and flexible 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Undeclared and flexible 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Job status  
Multiple employer 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Trust issues  
Network to obtain job: 
relatives 
1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Network to obtain job: friends 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Network to obtain job: others 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Specific skill requirements  
Employer required particular 
skills 
1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Self-perception of relevant skills  
Personal traits  PCA analysis scores 
Specific skills PCA analysis scores 
General skills  PCA analysis scores 
Occupational structure  
Elderly caring tasks 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Children caring tasks 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Cleaning tasks 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Workers’ characteristics   
Age Age reported (years) 
Age
2
 Squared age (years) 
Origin 1 if Migrants; 0 Native 
Marital status: single 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Marital status: widow or 
divorced 
1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Marital status: married 1 if yes; 0 otherwise 
Employers’ characteristics 1 if living in a house; 0 apartment 
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Table A2 displays the estimated factors, and indicates that four factors with eigenvalue greater 
than one explain 53.49% of the variance of skills. The value of the KMO test (0.811) reveals a 
good adequacy of the sample. 
Table A2 
The self-perception of relevant skills: principal component analysis 
PCA factors: Explained variance 
(Cronbach Alpha) 
Skills and abilities 
Factor 1: Personal traits Personal service (dealing with people) 
26.6% (0.695) Problem solving 
 Discretion 
 Humility 
 Work satisfaction 
Factor 2: Specific skills Care experience 
9.6% (0.686) Active listening 
 Counseling 
Factor 3: Flexibility Ability to adapt 
9.3% (0.381) Work autonomy 
 Rapidity 
Factor 4: General skills General experience 
7.95% (0.526) Availability 
 Training 
 
On further analysis of the main components, we find that the abilities labeled as “personal 
traits” explain 26.6% of the variability of data including traits like humility, discretion, and 
work satisfaction. Two other components (2 and 4) show the relevance of general and specific 
experience. Finally, the third component brings together the skills related to autonomy in work 
and ability to adapt. Table 6 also presents the Cronbach alpha in parentheses after the proportion 
of explained variance. The estimates reported for skill and ability subsets range between 0.381 
and 0.695. Given the very low internal consistency of the factor labeled as “flexibility”, we 
decided to exclude it in further analyses. 
 
 
